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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Previous  research  has  noted  disrupted  patterns  of neural  activation  during  emotion,
processing  in  individuals  with  autism  spectrum  disorders  (ASD).  However,  prior  research
relied on,  designs  that  may  place  greater  cognitive  load  on  individuals  with  ASD.  In  order
to  address  this  issue,  we  adapted  the  fMRI  task  of  Ochsner  et  al. (2004a)  for children  by,
presenting  fewer  stimuli,  with  fewer  valence  levels,  and  longer  stimuli  duration.  A localizer
sample of,  typically  developing  children  (n = 26)  was  used  to construct  regions  of interest
involved  in emotional,  processing.  Activations  in  these  regions  during  self-  and  other-
referential  emotion  processing  was,  compared  in age, IQ, gender  matched  groups  (n = 17
ASD, n  =  16  TD).  Matched  samples  replicate,  condition  contrasts  of  the  localizer,  but noelf-referential processing
onnectivity
group  differences  were  found  in  behavior  measures  or,  neural  activation.  An exploratory
functional  connectivity  analysis  in  a  subset  of  the matched  groups,  also  did  not  detect  strik-
ing  differences  between  the  groups.  These  ﬁndings  suggest  that  disruptions  in  activation  in
emotion  processing  neural  networks  in  ASD  is  partially  a function  of  task  related  cognitive
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. Introduction
Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are a set of pervasive
eurodevelopmental disorders characterized by a triad
f  impairments that include a delay or the absence of
ommunicative skills, restricted interests and stereotyped,
epetitive behaviors, and ﬁnally, impairment in social
nteractions. Social impairments manifest across a variety
f  domains in behavior and brain function. Individuals
ith ASD exhibit disrupted processing of faces (Behrmann
t  al., 2006; Chawarska and Shic, 2009; Klin et al., 2002;
ebb et al., 2010), actions and biological motion (Blake
t  al., 2003; Cook et al., 2009; Kaiser et al., 2010; Klin et al.,
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2009), and emotions (Greimel et al., 2010; Nuske et al.,
2013;  Sigman et al., 1997). High priority has been given
to  identifying the neural bases of these deﬁcits, evidenced
by  the increasing amount of research dedicated to them. A
speciﬁc  focus, of particular relevance to the current study,
has  been research into the way in which typically develop-
ing  individuals (TD) and individuals with an ASD represent
and  process emotion about themselves and others.
Although there is a general consensus that individuals
with an ASD tend to have impairments in processing
emotion, the pattern of results is complex (for reviews
see Harms et al., 2010; Weigelt et al., 2012). So while
both parents rate their children with ASD and the indi-
viduals with an ASD tend to rate themselves as having
more difﬁculty in recognizing their own  emotions and
exhibiting emotional awareness (Hill et al., 2004; Hobson
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.et  al., 2006), individuals can reliably exhibit and identify
emotions when tested (Hobson et al., 2006). Complexity of
emotion  seems to be an important dimension, since they
perform better on simpler emotions such as happiness and
NC-ND license.
al Cogni122 B.C. Vander Wyk  et al. / Development
fear, while struggling with more complex emotions such
as  shame (Heerey et al., 2003). The concepts of empathy
and emotion processing are intimately linked, especially
in  the literature discussing ASD. Individuals with autism
have  generally failed cognitive empathy tasks, which
possibly involve the mentalization system or higher order
inferential processes (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright,
2004; Rogers et al., 2006). But it should be noted that many
of  the empathy self-report measures focus on cognitive
components of empathy. Thus when measures of affective
empathy are used individuals with autism do not appear
to  be as impaired (Dziobek et al., 2008).
In an important paper, Ochsner et al. (2004a) utilized
fMRI to identify both distinct and overlapping regions for
processing the self-referential and other-referential affect,
relative  to a non-emotional control task in typically devel-
oping  adults. They presented affective pictures, which
included positive, negative, and neutral images, drawn
from  the International Affective Picture Set (IAPS; Lang
et  al., 2008). Participants were asked to judge the affect
in  the picture, again positive, negative or neutral, either
with  respect to their own affect in response to the picture
or  with respect to the person in the picture. Regions com-
mon  to self and other representation included the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the inferior and middle frontal
gyrus  (IFG and MFG), and the superior temporal gyrus and
sulcus  (STG and STS). Several regions were activated more
strongly  during self-referential processing, including more
specialized regions of the mPFC, the MFG, and the mid-
dle  temporal gyrus, while regions in the IFG and posterior
midline structures exhibited greater activation to other-
referential processing. In general, this set of ﬁnding has
held  up in subsequent studies (Legrand and Ruby, 2009;
Northoff et al., 2006; Uddin et al., 2007).
The experimental design described in Ochsner’s study
has  since been used in several neuroimaging studies of
individuals with ASD. For example, using a novel faces set,
fMRI  studies of self- and other-referential processing were
run  in adults (Schulte-Rüther et al., 2011) and adolescents
(Greimel et al., 2010). Adults were reported as hav-
ing aberrant patterns of activation (sometimes ASD > TD,
sometimes TD > ASD) during self- and other-referential
affective processing in some of the key regions described
above, including mPFC and IFG. Adolescents were reported
as  having lower activation in IFG relative to controls dur-
ing  self-referential processing. Another study of adults with
ASD  using a very similar paradigm as that in the Ochsner
study also reported a pattern of deviant activations in
these  key structures in ASD relative to TD controls (Silani
et  al., 2008). These ﬁndings, especially when added to a
literature  of disrupted cognitive self-referential processing
(Lombardo et al., 2010; Pfeifer et al., 2013), paint a picture
of  a highly disrupted representation of self-knowledge and
awareness.
However,  it is interesting to note that in addition to
using a similar method of emotional judgments, the tim-
ing  of the follow-up ASD studies was also very similar to
the  original Ochsner study. That study was designed for,
and  carried out in, TD adults. Stimuli were presented for 2s
followed  by a rating scale for 1.5 s. The stimuli and affec-
tive  judgments utilized 3 levels of emotional valence. Thetive Neuroscience 8 (2014) 121–130
Greimel  and Schulte-Rüther studies presented stimuli for
2.5  s, with an average ISI of 0.7 s. The Silani study presented
stimuli for 2 s followed by a 4 s response window. All three
studies  had three levels of stimuli and judgment valence.
Given that concurrent affective and cognitive processing
affect one another (Blair et al., 2007; Pessoa et al., 2005)
the  question can be asked, without invalidating the pre-
vious  results, what effect might the cognitive load of the
tasks  have had on this kind of emotional processing in ASD
relative  to TD individuals?
In  face processing literature differences between ASD
and  TD groups are less evident in tasks with lower dif-
ﬁculty or cognitive load. For example, individuals with
ASD  tend to do worse on face recognition tasks using mis-
matched labels (Grossman et al., 2000) or when faces are
presented very rapidly (Clark et al., 2008). However, indi-
viduals  with ASD not as evidently impaired especially if the
emotions  expressed are basic (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997)
or  presentation is slower (Michelle and Rutherford, 2008).
Task  demands can also change the likelihood of ﬁnding
differences in brain activation. For example, expression
matching tasks are likely to drive differences in activation
within face-processing regions between ASD and TD partic-
ipants,  while face labeling tasks are not (Piggot et al., 2004;
Wang  et al., 2004).
In  order to address the issue of cognitive load, we
adapted the task of Ochsner et al. (2004a) for chil-
dren. Participants viewed age-appropriate emotionally
salient pictures and were asked to evaluate how they
felt  about each picture (Self condition), how the peo-
ple  in the pictures felt (other condition), or where the
picture was taken (control condition). Stimuli were pre-
sented  for a total of 5.5 s and were present while children
made ratings. The valence dimensions in the pictures
and the requested responses were limited to only posi-
tive  and negative (neutral was eliminated). The primary
planned contrast was between emotion judgment condi-
tions  and the non-emotion judgment condition (self and
other  > location) with the hypothesis that with the lower
processing demands, the differences between the groups
would be attenuated or eliminated. A secondary compar-
ison  of interest is the contrast between self-referential
processing and other-referential processing (self > other).
2. Materials and methods
2.1.  Participants
Two  samples of typically developing children, a local-
izer  sample and a matched control sample and a sample
of  children with an ASD participated in the study. Indi-
viduals were excluded from participation in the current
study if parents reported that the child had experienced
neurological problems or abnormalities (unrelated to
autism).  In addition, if the child ever experienced seizures,
epilepsy, hearing or vision loss, motor impairment, or
severe  allergies, then he or she was  excluded from partic-
ipation. Typically developing children were prescreened
and excluded from participation if they had a ﬁrst degree
relative with an ASD, or if parent responses on the Adoles-
cent  and Child Symptom Inventories (Gadow and Sprafkin,
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Table 1
Demographic information for participant samples.
N Age in months Full-scale IQ SRS
Max  Min  Mean Max  Min  Mean Maxa Min  Mean
TDb 16 (1 Female) 222 129 158 127 78 105 55 34 42
ASD 17 (1 Female) 210 114 162 136 70 108 90 52 76
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a SRS T-scores cap at 90.
b One TD individual did not complete a DAS-II IQ test.
994) indicated potential serious psychiatric conditions,
uch as major depressive disorder. Typically developing
hildren were also required to have social responsiveness
Constantino, 2002; Constantino et al., 2003) T-scores < 60,
hich  is the cut-off for clinically signiﬁcant social deﬁcits.
SD  diagnosis was conﬁrmed by expert clinical evalua-
ions, ADOS (Lord et al., 2000) Module 13 (n = 15) Module 4
n  = 2), and ADI-R (Lord and Rutter, 1994). All participants
except for one) met  cut-offs based on the revised scoring
lgorithm (Gotham et al., 2007). The individual who did
ot  meet the cutoff was, nevertheless, deemed to be
n  the spectrum by an expert clinician with experience
iagnosing autism spectrum disorders.
After further exclusions, described in Section 2.8 below,
he  ﬁnal localizer sample consisted of 26 individuals (16
emale,  mean age in years = 12.1), the ﬁnal matched con-
rol  sample consisted of 16 individuals (1 female, mean age
n  years = 13.1), and the ﬁnal ASD sample consisted of 17
ndividuals (1 female, mean age in years = 13.5).
The TD and ASD matched samples were matched on
ender, age, and full scale IQ, assessed using the GCA
cale of the DAS-II. The ratio of genders did not differ in
he  matched groups (Fischer’s exact test, p = 0.742). The
atched groups did not differ by age (t(31) = 0.4, p = 0.69),
r  full-scale IQ (t(30) = 0.46, p = 0.65). As expected the
roups differed signiﬁcantly on social responsiveness scale
-scores,  (t(31) = 9.95, p < 0.001). Details are presented in
able  1.
Children were recruited through online and print adver-
isements. Parents or guardians gave written informed
onsent for the minors to participate in research. Assent
as  obtained for each minor participant by giving
ge-appropriate verbal and written explanations of the
esearch  protocols and their rights. Research was reviewed
nd  approved by the Institution’s Human Investigation
ommittee.
.2. Stimuli and design
Experimental  stimuli were present using an E-Prime
.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) script. Each
articipant was presented with a series of pictures and was
equired  to make judgments under three conditions. In the
elf  condition, they were asked whether the picture made
hem  feel good or bad. In the Other condition, they were
sked whether the person or people in the picture felt good
r  bad. In the Location condition, they were asked whether
he  picture was taken inside or outside. Responses were
ade  by pressing a corresponding button located in each
and.  The left button box was used for ‘good’ and ‘inside’;140 80 109 55 37 45
the  right button box was used for ‘bad’ and ‘outside’. All
button  presses were recorded with an inline E-prime script.
The  pictures were chosen from the International Affective
Picture System (Lang et al., 2008), and balanced for valence.
All  pictures included people.
The  experiment consisted of 20 s of initial ﬁxation and
12  s of ﬁnal ﬁxation. Each condition (Self, Other, and Loca-
tion)  was  presented in 5 blocks. Each block was  preceded by
an  auditory and visual task reminder. (e.g. “Now it is time
to  respond to how the person in the picture feels.”) Each
block  was  26 s long and consisted of 4 picture judgment
trials. Blocks were balanced for picture valence (two posi-
tive  and two  negative). Each picture was  presented for 5.5 s,
with  an auditory prompt appearing after 2 s (e.g. “Do  they
feel  good or bad?”). Consecutive pictures were separated
by  1 second of ﬁxation. To mitigate against order effects,
three versions of the task were administered using differ-
ent  task orders with the constraint that no condition could
be  presented twice in a row. To mitigate against idiosyn-
cratic effects of speciﬁc pictures, the assignment of pictures
to  conditions was changed for each version. To ensure that
each  child understood the task, they were given a practice
session prior to the experiment that familiarized them with
the  task using pictures not included in the experiment.
2.3. Behavioral data coding
For  the self emotional judgment conditions, there is
no  true correct response for any given probe. A positive
valence picture could plausibly induce a negative affect
(e.g.  the happy picture of a child with a dog might make
a  participant sad if they recently lost their dog). However,
for the purposes of analyses both Self and Other responses
were coded as correct or incorrect relative to the standard
valence of a picture, i.e. positive pictures should be given a
“Good”  response, negative pictures should be given a “Bad”
response.  Location judgment responses were coded as cor-
rect  relative to the most common response (“inside” or
“outside”) given to that picture in a pilot group of adults.
2.4.  Data acquisition
Imaging data were collected on a Siemens 3T Tim
Trio scanner. T1-weighted anatomical images were
acquired using an MPRAGE sequence (TR = 1900 ms;
TE  = 2.96 ms;  FOV = 256 mm;  image matrix 256 × 256;
1  mm × 1 mm × 1 mm).  Whole-brain functional images
were acquired using a single-shot, gradient-recalled echo
planar  pulse sequence (TR = 2000 ms;  TE = 25 ms;  ﬂip
angle = 60◦; FOV = 220 mm;  image matrix = 64 × 64; voxel
al Cogni124 B.C. Vander Wyk  et al. / Development
size = 3.4 mm × 3.4 mm × 3.4 mm;  34 slices) sensitive to
blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) contrast.
2.5. Preprocessing
Functional data were analyzed with the BrainVoy-
ager QX 2.6 (BrainInnovation, Maastricht, the Netherlands)
software package. The ﬁrst 5 functional volumes were dis-
carded.  Preprocessing of the remaining functional data
included slice scan time correction using cubic spline inter-
polation,  motion scrubbing (described below), 3D motion
correction using trilinear interpolation to correct for small
head  movements, linear trend removal, and temporal
high pass ﬁltering to remove low-frequency non-linear
drifts 2 or fewer cycles per time course (2.86 × 10−3 Hz),
and Gaussian spatial smoothing using a 7 mm kernel.
Functional images were co-registered to each individual’s
anatomical volume and transformed into Talairach space
(Talairach and Tournoux, 1988).
2.6. Motion scrubbing
The  functional data for each participant were subjected
to  the following process for motion scrubbing. First, each
functional run was analyzed and an optimal volume was
selected  for the purpose of serving as the reference volume
for  motion-correction and anatomical coregistration pre-
processing steps. The optimal volume was deﬁned as the
functional volume for which the sum of estimated motion
parameters relative to that volume was minimized. After
preprocessing, the motion estimates across all individuals
were inspected. Among the subset of functional runs with
no  motion estimate greater than 3 (standard motion exclu-
sion  criteria), the distribution of volume-to-volume motion
changes  was computed. Next, the per volume motion char-
acteristics for all functional runs was inspected. Volumes
were marked for excision for excessive drifts and motion
spikes. A volume exhibited excessive drift if it exceeded
an absolute motion parameter greater than 3 relative to
that  person’s optimal reference volume. A volume exhib-
ited  a motion spike if it exceeded a motion parameter
that differed, absolutely, from the prior volume’s motion
greater than 0.26, which represents 6 standard deviations
greater than what was observed in the standard sam-
ple.  Entire functional runs were excluded from analysis
based on the proportion of data remaining after scrub-
bing (described below). A set of independent samples t-test
were  computed to compare the ASD and TD groups. After
motion  scrubbing, they did not differ in the maximum esti-
mated  motion parameter (t(31) = 0.49, p = 0.63), the mean
estimated motion parameter (t(31) = 0.61, p = 0.55), the
mean  estimated volume to volume motion (t(31) = 0.76,
p  = 0.46), or the proportion of data remaining after scrub-
bing  (t(31) = 0.47, p = 0.64).
2.7. First-level statistical modelA general linear model (GLM) was used to compute
ﬁrst-level statistics on the Z-normalized BOLD signal for
each  individual. A model time course was constructed
for condition (Self, Other, and Location) by convolving ative Neuroscience 8 (2014) 121–130
gamma  function (Boynton et al., 1996) with a boxcar func-
tion  equal to 1.0 when the condition was present in the
experiment and 0.0 otherwise. An emotional valence model
timecourse was created for each condition by convolving
a  step function with the gamma  function. In this case the
step  function was  deﬁned as 1.0 during the presentation of
positively  valence pictures, −1.0 during the presentation of
negatively  valence pictures, and 0.0 otherwise. Motion esti-
mates  derived from the motion correction were added as
nuisance  predictors. Experimental and nuisance predictors
were  Z-normalized. If a volume was marked for excision by
the  motion scrubbing algorithm, the corresponding time-
point  in the design matrix was  also removed.
2.8. Exclusions
Individuals’ were excluded on the basis of issues
with behavioral, motion, and functional data. They were
excluded if the overall proportion of behavioral responses
coded as correct was less than 0.67, this represents above
chance performance (p < 0.05) on a binomial distribution.
Individuals were excluded if the computed beta value
to  Self, Other, and Location in the visual cortex, deﬁned
anatomically from Brodmann’s Area 17, was  each less than
0.0,  indicating unexplained deactivation to visual stimuli.
For  standard analysis they were excluded if, following
motion scrubbing, less than 75% of the data remained (over-
all  and per condition). For connectivity analyses, they were
excluded  if the proportion was below 95%.
A total of 20 children with ASD were excluded: 8 for fail-
ing  to meet behavioral criteria, 1 for not showing an evoked
response in V1, 9 for motion, and 2 for behavior and motion.
A  total of 13 typically developing children were excluded:
5  for behavior, 4 for motion, 1 for motion and above cutoff
SRS  score, 1 for motion, behavior, and SRS score, and 2 for no
evoked  response in V1. The behavioral data for one TD child
was  not collected in scanner due to technical malfunction,
but task understanding was subsequently assessed outside
the  magnet. Their brain data was  included in the analysis,
but  their behavioral data was  not.
2.9. Event-related functional connectivity
To compute the connectivity between two  ROIs, the
mean time course from each was extracted and z-
normalized. The ﬁrst order statistical model (experimental
conditions, picture valence, instruction presentation, and
motion)  plus a white matter nuisance predictor was
regressed out of the mean time course. For ROIs, denoted
Ri and Rj we denoted a window of 5 successive timepoints,
as t(Ri) and t(Rj), respectively. The functional distance
FD(RiRj) between each window, deﬁned as the Euclidean
distance in functional space between them, is given as:
FD(RiRj) = sqrt(sum((t(Ri) − t(Rj))2). Functional (Euclidean)
distance has been used in a variety of contexts to opera-
tionalize similarity and connectivity (Bullmore et al., 1996;
Friston,  1994; Shen et al., 2010). Here, because other
sources of signal variability, such as task, motion, and scan-
ner/biological noise, have been regressed out we interpret
the  value as indexing bidirectional connectivity.
B.C. Vander Wyk  et al. / Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 8 (2014) 121–130 125
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Fig. 2. Regions discovered in localizer analysis. Blue: location > emotion.
Orange: Emotion > location. Regions are rendered in functional resolution
on a reconstructed cortical surface. Voxels that are semi-transparent are
by  a factor of 2. First-level contrasts were entered into aig. 1. Proportion correct and reaction time as a function of condition and
roup. Error bars denote SE.
The algorithm was iterated over the entire time course
y  moving the window from volume 5 (window over time-
oints  1–5) to the ﬁnal volume V (window over timepoints
−5 to V). Event-related plots were constructed by averag-
ng  subsets of the FD series, time-aligned to the onset of the
lock  of a given condition. These plots represent temporal
oving averages of the functional distance between two
OIs  as a function of the presentation of different stimulus
onditions.
.  Results and discussion
.1.  Behavioral data
Behavioral  responses during the in-scanner task were
nalyzed for the matched samples. Proportion correct
deﬁned above) and reaction were used as dependent vari-
bles  (Fig. 1).
.1.1.  Proportion correct
Proportion  correct was  analyzed using a mixed design
NOVA with a Greenhouse–Geisser correction. Condition
Self, Other, and Location) was treated as a within-subject
actor and group (ASD or TD) was treated as a between-
ubjects factor. There was a main effect of condition,
F(1.47,44.25) = 20.75, p < 0.001, 2 = 409) and a main effect
f  group, such that the ASD group was less accurate over-
ll  (F(1,30) = 5.43, p < 0.05, 2 = 153). Post hoc tests using
he  Bonferroni correction method revealed that partici-
ants were signiﬁcantly more accurate during the Other
ondition than the Self (p < 0.05) or Location (p < 0.001)
onditions and that participants were signiﬁcantly more
ccurate during Self than Location conditions (p < 0.05).located below the rendered cortical surface. (For interpretation of the ref-
erences to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of the article.)
3.1.2. Reaction time
Reaction  time (RT) was also analyzed using the same
mixed design ANOVA, though correction for violations of
the  assumption of sphericity was unnecessary (Mauchly’s
test (2(2) = 1.41, p = 0.495). There was  a main effect of con-
dition,  (F(2,60) = 21.84, p < 0.001, 2 = 421), but no effect of
group  (F(1,30) = 0.13, p = 0.912). Post hoc tests using the
Bonferroni correction method revealed that participants
were signiﬁcantly faster to respond during the Self con-
dition  than the Other (p < 0.001) or Location (p < 0.001)
conditions.
3.2.  fMRI localizer analysis
An  analysis of the patterns of activation in the Localizer
samples was  used to construct regions of interest (ROIs).
First,  an antomical mask was constructed by averaging
participants’ Talairach normalized anatomical images to
exclude  voxels outside the averaged brain, white mat-
ter,  or ventricles from analysis. The ﬁrst-level GLM was
used  to compute beta values. A contrast was computed
between emotion judgment conditions (Self and Other)
and  the non-emotion judgment condition (Location). The
contrast  was balanced by multiplying the Location betassecond-level random effects analysis. The resulting t maps
were  thresholded at the voxel level, false discovery rate
(FDR)  q < 0.005 (Genovese et al., 2002), and at the cluster
126 B.C. Vander Wyk  et al. / Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 8 (2014) 121–130
Table  2
Peak  Talairach coordinates for regions signiﬁcant regions by contrast.
Contrast Region Hemisphere TAL mm3
X Y Z
Emotion > Location STS R 46 −34 3 432
mPFC L −4 50 24 1026
aTP L −47 9 −23 756
IFG L −44 25 −7 486
STG L −57 −50 24  729
Location > Emotion Pcu R 30 −72 37 2052
MFG R 
pMFG L 
aMFG L 
level, contiguous k > 300 mm3. The regions are described
in Table 2 and depicted in Fig. 2.
Emotion judgments activated many of the key regions
marked by previous literature, including the medial pre-
frontal  cortex (mPFC), the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG),
the  left anterior temporal pole (aTP), and temporal cortex
bilaterally in the left superior temporal gyrus (STG) and
the  right superior temporal sulcus (STS). Identifying these
regions  as showing robust preferential activation to emo-
tion  judgments, thereby replicating previous ﬁndings, both
validates  the paradigm and also provides ROIs that are used
in  subsequent analyses in the matched samples.
Although not our primary interest, several regions
showed stronger activation to the Location judgment con-
dition  than to the emotion judgments. These included
several frontal regions on the left and right side, as well
as  a posterior parietal region that was identiﬁed in the
Talairach.org database (Lancaster et al., 1997, 2000) as the
precuneus (PCu). These regions were also used in subse-
quent analysis, chieﬂy as a means of assessing the degree
to  which the matched samples replicated the ﬁndings of
the  Localizer sample.
3.3.  Region of interest analysis on matched samples
The ﬁrst-level GLM was computed per Localizer ROI
for  each participant in the matched samples. The set
of  beta values computed for the Self, Other, and Loca-
tion conditions, which are plotted in Fig. 3. These betas
were  entered into two second level mixed design ANOVAs
with  a Greenhouse–Geisser correction, one each for emo-
tion  preferential regions and the location preferential
regions, respectively. ROI and condition were treated as
within-subject factors and group (ASD or TD) was  treated
as  a between-subjects factor.
3.3.1. Emotion ROI ANOVA
The ANOVA determined that there were signiﬁ-
cant main effects of ROI (F(2.93,90.91) = 10.69, p < 0.001,
2 = 0.559) and condition (F(1.95,60.42) = 29.39,p < 0.001,
2 = 648) and a signiﬁcant ROI by condition interaction
(F(5.70,176.58) = 6.32, p < 0.001, 2 = 690). No signiﬁcant
interactions with group were observed, although the ASD
sample  was insigniﬁcantly more active than the TD group
overall  (F(1,31,) = 2.78, p = 0.11, 2 = 0.082).28 7 54 432
−24 7 49 351
−49 24 30 351
Of secondary interest was the contrast between self-
and  other-referential processing. Collapsing across ROIs,
post  hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction method
revealed that Self had signiﬁcantly higher activation than
Other  (p < 0.01) and Location (p < 0.001), and the Other had
signiﬁcantly higher activation than Location (p < 0.001). To
further  explore differential activation speciﬁcally to Self
and  Other across the ROIs, a set of two-tailed paired t-tests
using  the Bonferroni correction method revealed that Self
activation was greater than other in the mPFC (t(32) = 5.30,
p  < 0.001), the left IFG (t(32) = 3.86, p < 0.01), and the left
STG  (t(32) = 3.19, p < 0.05).
3.3.2. Location ROI ANOVA
An ANOVA determined that were signiﬁcant a
main effects of ROI (F(2.41,74.65.) = 11.91, p < 0.001,
2 = 277) and condition (F(1.79,55.39) = 34.17,p < 0.001,
2 = 0.524) and a signiﬁcant ROI by condition interaction
(F(4.57,141.72) = 9.63, p < 0.001, 2 = 0.237). There was
no  main effect of group, but there was  a marginal group
by  condition interaction (F(1.79,55.39) = 2.87, p = 0.071,
2 = 0.085). Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction
method revealed that Location had signiﬁcantly higher
activation than Self (p < 0.001) and Other (p < 0.001).
3.4.  Exploratory connectivity analysis in low motion
subsets of matched samples
Deﬁcits  in functional connectivity are a frequently
reported feature of the neural functioning of individuals
with ASD. Since our groups exhibited such similarity in
activation patterns, we  hypothesized that functional con-
nectivity  patterns in this sample may  also be similar. Due to
the  susceptibility of connectivity analyses to motion arti-
facts  (Power et al., 2012), they were performed on only
a  restricted subset of individuals in the matched samples
with very low levels of motion. Speciﬁcally, 95% or more of
an  individual’s data had to remain after motion scrubbing.
This left a sample of 10 TD individuals and 9 individuals
with ASD. Due to the small sample size these analyses
should be considered exploratory. We  restricted connec-
tivity  analyses by only computing connections between
the  mPFC and left IFG ROIs and between the mPFC and the
left  STS ROI. The mPFC and IFG ROIs were chosen because
they each exhibited strong preferential responses to emo-
tion  conditions in both groups. The connection between the
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Fig. 3. Beta values as a function of condition from matched samples extracted from localizer ROIS. Plots are grouped according to contrast. Regions
bounded  by blue: location > emotion. Orange: emotion > location. The three plots on the right are located right hemisphere, others are located in the left.
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PFC and STG ROIs affords the opportunity to explore long
ange  fronto-temporal connections that previous research
as  indicated is disrupted in ASD. The STG ROI did not show
s  strong a preferential response to emotion conditions.
owever, a post hoc test using the Bonferroni correction
id indicate that the difference between Self and Location
as  signiﬁcant (p < 0.001), while the difference between
ther and Location was nearly so (p = 0.057). Since we  were
nterested in connectivity during emotion processing, the
elf  and Other conditions were collapsed for the purposes
f  this analysis. Results are displayed in Fig. 4.
.  Discussion
In  the current study brain activation was recorded in
amples of TD and ASD children while they made emotional
nd  non-emotional judgments of pictures. Despite prior
esearch suggesting that individuals with ASD have altered
ctivation during emotion processing we found no effect
f  group, in either the emotion or non-emotion conditions
ithin regions localized in an independent group of TD par-
icipants.  Crucially, the task used in this study was much
impler than those used in previously, utilizing longer
timulus latencies and fewer levels of emotion valence
n  both the pictures themselves and in the responses the
articipants’ were asked to make. These differences were
ntended to reduce the difﬁculty of the task and cogni-
ive load on the participants. The ASD and TD groupsthe references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the
exhibited comparable, above chance, performance the task
suggesting the changes were successful in equating difﬁ-
culty  across the groups.
In  the localizer sample several regions of interest were
found to preferentially respond during non-emotion judg-
ments,  including the precuneus and bilateral regions of the
middle  frontal gyrus. Emotion judgments also preferen-
tially activated a network of both frontal regions such as the
medial  prefrontal cortex and left inferior frontal gyrus, as
well  as temporal regions including the left anterior tempo-
ral  pole, and bilateral superior temporal gyrus/sulcus. Both
the  matched TD and ASD groups replicated the preferential
responses to non-emotional judgments the results of the
Localizer sample, i.e. Location was  signiﬁcantly more active
in  the respective regions relative to the emotion condi-
tions. Conversely, the matched samples also replicated the
preferential responses to emotion processing in the emo-
tion  ROI. Critically, there were no signiﬁcant differences
between the ASD and TD groups in indicating equivalent
neural activation during emotion processing. This suggests
that,  with a sufﬁciently low cognitive load, individuals with
ASD  may  not exhibit emotion process deﬁcits in cortical
activation. This ﬁnding contrasts with prior studies of the
neural  correlates of emotion processing in ASD.In addition to methodological differences built into
the  study related to task difﬁculty, several other factors
may  contribute to the discrepant results. First, the groups
used  here were children somewhat younger than those
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Fig. 4. Event-related function distance (FD) values as a function of group
during emotion processing. Emotion blocks start at volume 1. Error bars
denote SE.
previously studied. This certainly is not the ﬁrst study
to  examine emotion processing in children with ASD,
but  many of the prior studies have focused on adults.
Developmental processes, both biological and psycholog-
ical,  make direct cross-sectional comparisons between
children and adults challenging. Additionally, there is
the  real possibility that cohort effects may  be inﬂuencing
the results. Individuals with ASD are more likely to be
identiﬁed and start treatment earlier now than in the past.
Thus,  adult participants from several years ago may  have
different developmental trajectories than individuals that
are  children now. The TD and ASD samples were also quite
homogenous, being matched on age, gender, IQ, and not
differing on behavioral performance or in-scanner motion.
While  this represents strength of the study in terms of
experimental control, it may  also mean that the ASD
sample is not generally representative of children with
ASD.  Another potential concern in interpreting the results
might  be that differences in activation between the groups
are  being obscured by noise. However, it is important to
note  that both groups performed the behavioral task above
chance  with equivalent levels of accuracy and latency.
Most critically, brain activation was not simply equivalent
across the TD and ASD, but it is also the case that both
groups replicated the condition contrasts of the localizer
group in both the emotion and location ROIs.tive Neuroscience 8 (2014) 121–130
More speciﬁc patterns of activation within emotion
processing regions were also observed. Consistent with
previous studies, the mPFC showed stronger activa-
tion during self-referential processing compared to other
referential process. The mPFC has been shown to be con-
sistently active during a broad range of mentalizing tasks
(Gusnard et al., 2001; Mitchell et al., 2005a) about other
individuals. However, it is also consistently active dur-
ing  self-referential processing (Heatherton et al., 2006;
Mitchell et al., 2005b, 2006), leading some researchers to
theorize  that it serves a dual role in social cognition. The
results of the current study are broadly consistent with this
theory.  However, it appears to play this role in both the TD
and  ASD groups.
In  an exploratory connectivity analysis, two  intriguing
patterns emerged. First, temporal changes in the degree of
functional  connectivity during emotion processing differ
between pairs of regions. The connectivity between mPFC
and  IFG seems to increase sharply as processing contin-
ues,  while the connectivity between mPFC and STG exhibits
very  weak temporal changes. We  speculate that these dif-
ferences  arise from the differential function of the involved
ROI  pairs. The IFG is often implicated in emotion regula-
tion  (Goldin et al., 2008; Ochsner et al., 2004b) and may
be  called on to increase the degree of regulation over the
mPFC  as a block of emotional stimuli is presented in succes-
sion.  However, the STG may  be more involved in extracting
information from the images and passing it to frontal
regions which may  not change as much in time. A second
notable pattern is that the groups do not exhibit strik-
ing  differences in connectivity. If anything the ASD group
shows  stronger long-range connections between mPFC and
STG.  However, given the limitations of sample size these
interpretations cannot be considered anything other than
preliminary.
5.  Conclusions
The equivalent activation we  observed between ASD
and  TD individuals in regions involved in emotion
processing is generally inconsistent with the current con-
sensus  view. However, although a report of disrupted acti-
vation  is consistent across studies, the speciﬁc disruptions
are usually not. This inconsistency suggests that there are
crucial  dimensions that mediate whether normative or dis-
rupted  activations will be observed that are, as of yet, unac-
counted for. We  hypothesized that cognitive load is such a
dimension.  The current study was designed to require a rel-
atively  lower cognitive load than previous similar studies
by  presenting fewer stimuli, with fewer valence levels, and
longer  durations. The ﬁndings presented here suggest that
while  individuals with ASD may  be particularly vulnera-
ble  to disruptions of emotional processing, certain contexts
may  support preserved functions. Future studies that reﬁne
our  understanding of the contribution of cognitive load on
socio-emotional processing in ASD could have profound
implications for scaffolding approaches in treatment.Conﬂict of interest statement
The  authors have no conﬂicts of interest to declare.
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